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Summary  
This thesis examines the influence of the cyclical position on discretionary fiscal policy 
in twenty Western countries in the time period 1960-2004.  
 
The first chapter discusses economic theories related to the concept. A traditional 
Keynesian view of economic fluctuations is presented, saying that economic fluctuations 
should be avoided and that counter-cyclical fiscal policy is one way of dealing with the 
problem. This is then contrasted with several objections. Real business cycle theory 
doubts the adversity of fluctuations; from this point of view, there is nothing to gain from 
active stabilisation. The possible efficiency of fiscal policy can be doubted, for example, 
the Monetarist school claimed that a fiscal-monetary policy mix was a better option, and 
that active policy was more likely to fail than not. Finally, the intentions and abilities of 
policy-makers can be questioned; the optimal way to conduct policy may be unrealistic, 
and governments may have motives that conflict with the general interest.  
 Four hypotheses are presented. The primary question is whether fiscal policy is 
conducted in a counter-cyclical manner. I also look for changes in fiscal policy over time. 
In addition, I test for the influence of public debt and the effects of the political ideology 
of governments.  
 
The second chapter deals with measuring fiscal policy. Four different approaches are 
considered, leading to six different numerical indicators of discretionary fiscal policy. 
The cyclically adjusted balance, advocated by the OECD, uses country-specific 
production functions to calculate potential output, and estimates induced responses of 
economic variables to fluctuations in GDP. Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse uses 
unemployment data to adjust for cyclical variation. The indicator developed by Braconier 
and Holden adjusts using a combination of decomposed GDP data and unemployment. 
The discretionary budget balance, developed by myself, calculates trend values of parts 
of the budget not related to social security. The variations among these indicators are in 
some cases large, and are shown to influence the results of the econometric estimations. 
 
The third chapter concerns the econometric analysis. The hypotheses are formulated as 
linear equations, and are tested using the fixed effects estimator. Fiscal policy is shown to 
have a pro-cyclical tendency across all countries. When estimating the equations for 
countries separately, they are shown to have different characteristics, with pro-cyclical 
policy still being the dominant trend. The cyclically adjusted balance is shown to give 
results that deviate from the other indicators, generally indicating a more countercyclical 
policy. 
Public debt is found to lead to significantly tighter fiscal policy. 
 
For the remaining two hypotheses, no clear results are found. There are, however, 
indications suggesting a more pro-cyclical policy in the 1990s than in preceding decades. 
Conservative parties show a slight tendency to lead a less countercyclical policy, and 
strong governments appear to have more countercyclical tendencies than governments 
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Introduction 
As for so many other students of economics, my introduction to macroeconomic theory 
was the Keynesian model of demand, consumption and investment. An increase of 
government expenditures would, in this model, increase overall production, provided that 
there is available capacity in the economy. When searching for a topic to finish my 
master’s degree, I thought it would be interesting to examine whether this Keynesian 
model has any relevance in the real world; do governments act this way, or are other 
factors more important? Does the simple macroeconomic model have any relevance 
beyond being a useful pedagogic tool? 
This thesis examines the European countries of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK, in addition to Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and the US. I have 
mainly used data from the OECD Economic Outlook, which has been produced since 
1960. I have used STATA to examine the data, perform the regressions, and make some 
of the diagrams, while the rest of the figures are made in Excel. The tables of coefficients 
are also generated using self-made Excel macros.  
When working with the thesis, I was struck by the rather arbitrary way the indicators of 
fiscal stance were used; in the relatively few studies I have found, little justification is 
given. This thesis examines some of the differences between these calculations. The main 
hypotheses discussed are 
• Do governments act Keynesian? 
• Is fiscal policy constrained by public debt? 
• Has there been a trend towards less Keynesian policy? 
• Do the political views of the government matter for policy? 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first chapter deals with the traditional 
Keynesian motivations for fiscal policy and some of the main objections to these theories, 
and presents the central hypotheses of the dissertation. The second chapter concerns the 
methodology of measuring fiscal policy; several indicators of discretionary fiscal policy 
are presented, as well as some other values important for the calculations. The third and 
final chapter presents and discusses the results from the numerical analysis. 
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1 Thoughts behind Fiscal Policy  
The aim of this section is to shed light on the theoretical foundations of practical policy. 
What determines whether governments act counter-cyclically? The rationales for the 
Keynesian view of the world, as well as theories that could oppose its conclusions, will 
be discussed. 
1.1 Keynesian theories: Baseline  
Keynes’ “General Theory” was published in 1936. Rather ambitious, the book set out to 
reform the entire field of macroeconomics. In the first chapter, the business cycle theory 
prevalent at the time is referred to as a “special theory” applicable only to a few special 
cases, whereas Keynes’ theory, in contrast, should cover “the general case”1. Keynes 
seems to have had good reason for his arrogance; the book soon became a fundamental 
building block of economic policy.  
 
A common feature of what I will label traditional Keynesian theories is an emphasis on 
the adverse effects of economic fluctuations, and the importance of nominal variables, 
incomplete information, and externalities. Society as a whole may not be able to take the 
best possible actions. Thus, in recession, a rational government may prefer to increase its 
activity. If the activity level is lower than the government thinks optimal, with high 
unemployment and low consumption, public debt can be increased to finance public 
consumption instead, pushing the economy forward and lowering unemployment. The 
positive effects of such an expansion is assumed to outweigh the negative effects of 
increased public debt, as the Keynesian paradigm believes unemployment decreases 
slowly without government intervention. This focus on the adverse effects of economic 
fluctuations, and the possibility of policy to alleviate these effects through countercyclical 
policy, will be my reference description of traditional Keynesians.2  
                                                 
1 Keynes (1936), p. 3 
2 Lodewijks (2003) argues that the popularized form of Keynesianism has moved away from the ideas 
presented in “General Theory”. Whether this is correct or not, “Keynesianism” will, in this thesis, refer to 
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Models that incorporate nominal rigidities, such as the traditional Keynesian models of 
the 1950s and early 1960s, could, if taken to their ultimate conclusion, implicate quite 
simplistic conclusions; some Keynesian models may suggest that the government can run 
an expansionary fiscal policy indefinitely, to maintain an “artificially” high level of 
output. Such conclusions, however, fail to take account of the fact that people will simply 
adjust; they will come to expect such expansions, and this will affect, among other things, 
the way wages and prices are set, one feature that is typically taken as given in Keynesian 
models.3 For this reason, even if some Keynesian descriptions may implicate “paradise” 
policies, such conclusions should be (and are) met with scepticism. This is of course not 
the case for all such theory, and many modern Keynesian models incorporate the 
conclusions in other ways, such as multiple equilibria.  
1.2 The non-adverse cycle  
Several objections can be raised against the traditional Keynesian paradigm of demand 
management. I will present some of these below, grouped into three categories. The first 
objection, real business cycle-theory, says that avoiding fluctuations is not necessary. 
Economic fluctuations are assumed to be caused by fluctuations in “real” phenomena 
such as technological growth, and it is perfectly rational for the economy as a whole to 
slow down in recession; in addition to the preference for lower spending, lower 
productivity means consuming more leisure may be desirable. If this is correct, fiscal 
policy should not be used counter-cyclically, as fluctuations in output are merely 
fluctuations in the “natural” level. This train of thought, which is in accordance with 
much of pre-Keynesian macroeconomics, has been further extended in the second half of 
the twentieth century by economists such as Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott, known 
as “New Classicals”, a school that gained momentum through the stagflation of the 
1970s. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
this popularized version, as it is formalized into, for example, the IS-LM model, with emphasis on the 
implications specified above. 
3 See, for example, Romer(2001), p. 245 
 Is Fiscal Policy Keynesian? 5 
 
Traditional Keynesian models emphasise sticky prices and barriers to adjustment. Still, 
they need to have a “target” towards which the economy moves – even if it never gets 
there. As this target is defined by where the real variables have stabilized, it can be 
compared to the predictions of the classical models. Thus, similar movements in the 
economic variables can be interpreted differently with different theories. Classical 
theories may interpret a fluctuation as caused by changes in the real variables; a 
fluctuating equilibrium. Keynesian theories would agree that a theoretical “equilibrium” 
is defined by real variables; however, they would disagree on the volatility of this state, 
and rather interpret the fluctuations as deviation from this equilibrium, caused partly by 
fluctuations in nominal variables. 
If recessions are perceived as fluctuations in the natural level of output, as in classical 
business cycle theory, this has important policy implications. In some cases, a surprise 
recession could be interpreted as a reduction in expected future income; predictions about 
future income are based on income today, and are likely to go down in recession. This 
decrease in income could then induce consumption smoothing, meaning that 
consumption, private and public, should go down as well. This is in accordance with the 
“sound finance” view of public economics advocated by classical pre-Keynes 
economists. 
 
Another interpretation of this could be to understand the differences between traditional 
Keynesian and classical models as different opinions on the time perspective. Keynes is 
famous for saying “In the long run, we’re all dead”; he emphasised the short-run effects 
of economic policy. Keynesianism also recognizes that the economy will have to reach a 
“natural” equilibrium in the long run; however, this is assumed to take so long that 
demand management can have important effects in the short and medium run. Classicists, 
however, argue that the economy is in the Keynesian “long run” state all the time, and 
therefore focus more on this. This could mean that hard-line classicists would not 
acknowledge the Keynesian definition of recession, as the economy cannot, by definition, 
move below its natural level, and notions of any equilibria other than the observed states 
will not be needed.  
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1.3 The imperfection of economic policy  
Being sceptical to countercyclical economic policy does not necessarily imply a support 
for real business cycle theory. Even though one recognises the adverse effects of 
economic fluctuations, one does not have to believe in active stabilisation policy; it could 
be that fiscal policy is not a good tool to alleviate these adverse effects. 
 
Monetarist theory could be understood as a variant of such thoughts. In the debate 
between Keynesians and Monetarists of the 1960s, the Monetarists, championed by 
Milton Friedman, argued that the effect of monetary policy had been undervalued in the 
Keynesian consensus.4 They postulated that a combination of fiscal and monetary policy 
was the best way to regulate the economy. Along with this, the Monetarists were more 
sceptical to the role of policy in general, arguing that active policy often was conducted 
in a bad way and that economists could not be trusted to come up with optimal and “true” 
predictions.  
 
The effects of government interference may be limited by Ricardian equivalence; if the 
public does not believe a reduction of taxes during a recession is sustainable, they will 
simply save more, offsetting anticipated tax increases in the future. If the hypothesis of 
Ricardian equivalence holds, there may be good reasons to discard some Keynesian 
expansionary (or contractionary) activities. Romer (2001) argues that Ricardian 
equivalence has little practical value, at least in the short run, and is mainly interesting as 
a theoretical concept. This is partly because of the information problems described above, 
and partly because people do not seem to substitute between time periods in the way 
models of Ricardian equivalence predict.5  
 
Other theories do not disregard fiscal policy, but argues for different ways of using it. 
One example is the theory of expansionary fiscal contractions – that a tightening of 
public finance can spur economic growth. By reforming public expenditure, usually by 
cutting taxes, the government may signal a more sustainable public finance, prompting 
                                                 
4 Blanchard (2000), p. 540 
5 Romer (2001), p. p 540-41 
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higher confidence and increasing economic activity. This is mostly relevant when public 
finance is perceived to be unsustainable, and for rather large, structural adjustments. 
Eichengreen (1998) argues that the macroeconomic mechanisms function radically 
different when deficits are high; in this “non-Keynesian” range the well-known multiplier 
effect works in the other direction. In his model, a radical debt reduction in an indebted 
economy may cause a move from a high-debt, low GDP equilibrium to an equilibrium 
with higher GDP and lower debt.6 Though most scholars would agree to such a 
separation, there could be wide disagreement on how adverse the situation would have to 
be for the theory to be relevant.  
Several empirical studies argue for the existence of expansionary fiscal contractions. 
Giavazzo and Pagano (1990) identify two cases: Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s. 
Another study by the same authors from 1995 finds evidence of a contractionary fiscal 
expansion in Sweden in the early 1990s. Perotti (1999) identifies differences in the 
effects of fiscal policy in “good” and “bad” times, and argues that the difference is most 
pronounced following an increase in government spending. Hogan (2004) agrees with 
some of the conclusions, but argues that the effects are small and may not exceed the 
“traditional” contractionary effect of a fiscal tightening.  
1.4 The selfish government 
A third level of opposition to countercyclical policy concerns the way policy is carried 
out. Even though one accepts that cycles are adverse, and that policy, in theory, can help, 
traditional Keynesian theories can be criticized for having too much faith in policy-
makers – both regarding their motives and their abilities. In addition to the well-known 
market failures that will flourish if the economy is left to itself, government failures can 
be highlighted, forcing a choice between two evils, rather than a simple solution to an 
externality problem.7 
Theories on public choice and the influence of lobby groups has been around for some 
time, and have now been incorporated into a larger framework of political economics. In 
                                                 
6 There is a simple and informative figure on page 258 of Eichengreen’s comment. Another, less intuitive, 
figure on a similar case is found in Perotti (1999), p. 1409. 
7 Acocella (1998), p. xvi (preface) 
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the last quarter of the twentieth century, many theories have emerged studying the 
impacts of various policy rules and the need for the public to know the incentives of 
governments.8 An increased scepticism towards the motives of policy-makers may lead to 
new insights in the way governments act. Policies need not be collectively rational; they 
may be the results of the pressure of lobby groups, or, more relevant in this case, short-
sighted politicians may encourage public spending frenzies in an economic boom. 
Therefore, economists arguing against countercyclical policy need not necessarily 
denounce all the Keynesian reasoning. Even when agents have insufficient information or 
the wrong incentives, the benefits of collective decisions may be outweighed by the 
difficulty of getting policy-makers with incomplete information or dubious morale to act 
in an optimal way. This will be especially important in times of change, implying a less 
countercyclical attitude. 
  
Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1996) study the relation between fiscal prudence and 
government popularity. They find that the popularity enjoyed by governments and their 
probability of survival does not depend on their fiscal stance. This could imply that re-
election motivations are not crucial to explain an absence of reduced spending in good 
times. The authors suggest that hesitation to use contractionary fiscal policy could be 
motivated through other channels, such as the influence of public sector employees or 
government risk aversion.   
 
A related topic is that of fiscal discipline. Theories on endogenous policy has emphasised 
the need for rules, to avoid excessive budget deficits and other suboptimal policies. Once 
deficits are established, they are hard to remove. 9 Bernheim (1989, p. 61) polemized 
against the “philosopher-kings” that assumingly controlled policy in Keynesian models. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue that even though policy always maximises current and 
future welfare, time inconsistencies may lead to an overall suboptimal result.10 They 
argue for consistent policy rules, such as constant tax rates, to avoid these distortions. 
                                                 
8 Details can be found in Persson and Tabellini (2000), p. 2 
9 Romer (2001), p. 547 
10 Kydland and Prescott (1977), p. 487 
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Alesina and Perotti (1996b) claim that simple, numerical targets on budget deficits cause 
tax volatility and hinders transparent accounting, but nonetheless argue for some sort of 
spending controls, for example by voting on total budget size before discussing the 
budget composition. Deficit bias theories have been elaborated into more advanced 
political-economic models by, among others, Tornell and Lane (1999). 
1.5 Some important trends   
Above, some theoretical rationales for economic policy have been presented. The context 
in which policy is carried out is not constant. This section will address some issues 
connected to the economic and political environment of the last half of the twentieth 
century. 
1.5.1 Public debt 
The costs of increased public debt may be vague, and the public may have incomplete 
information on these, leading to an inefficiently high public consumption.11 In the 1970s 
and 80s, debt finance was widely used; this is usually explained by pressure from lobby 
groups and insufficient information12, as outlined in section 1.4. In the 1990s, most 
OECD countries seem to have realized that debt levels had to be stabilized.13 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of public debt in the 20 countries studied. Changing debt 
levels may have affected the ability of governments to conduct fiscal policy, and 
strengthens the need to adjust for public debt when estimating the relationships. 
                                                 
11 Romer (2001), p. 549 (partly referring to Buchanan and Wagner (1977)) 
12 Acocella (1998), p. 336 
13 Blanchard (2000), p. 524. Figures are from the OECD Economic Outlook data (see appendix for full list 
of data sources). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of gross public debt (debt/GDP ratio) 
 
Since the 1980s, capital markets have undergone massive deregulation. This could work 
in both directions; governments have less control over the flows of value, limiting their 
ability to “command” state loans, while deregulation in other countries increases the 
ability to offer cross-border loans. I will assume that these effects are not too volatile, and 
do not constitute important short-run deviations. However, it may constitute a difference 
over time, and could therefore disturb attempts to discern time trends in other variables, 
such as the theoretical foundations of policy. 
  
Government debt has a clear lender-borrower fundament, on which data is easily 
accessible. However, governments have other obligations than paying off their creditors. 
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A lot of government expenditure is tied up – not only this year, but in the years to come. 
Pension obligations, for example, may be large, and defaulting on these may be even 
less politically feasible than defaulting on public debt. Demographic changes of the kind 
typically experienced in Western countries, with a growing pensioner/worker-ratio, is an 
important influence in this context. Some obligations in actuarially “fair” systems may be 
recorded, but the main parts of pension obligations are still not tied to individuals in any 
way. These huge future obligations may not be as transparent at the time when policy is 
set, and may thus be less important than recorded debt in a policy-making perspective, 
but this is another factor that should be kept in mind when analyzing time trends. 
1.5.2 Growth of the public sector 
For the last fifty years, the relative size of government expenditure has increased as GDP 
has grown, as shown in Figure 2. One important reason for this is that social security is a 
normal good; as income goes up, people demand more social insurance, increasing 
government size.14 It may also be the case that equity is a normal good, increasing 
demand for transfers as income increases. In addition, the increase in the division of 
labour, in particular the increase of women in the work force, has increased demand for 
services traditionally not supplied by the government, such as child care and care for the 
elderly. Technological development has also helped; people now live longer. The steady 
increase in government expenditure, however, came to an abrupt stop around 1985-1990. 
In many countries, this may be due to the relative collapse of the welfare state and the 
following reduction of public spending. While the causes of this will not be discussed in 
the thesis, an important implication of the steady growth of the public sector, and the later 
decline, is that the ratio of public spending can not be assumed to be constant over the 
time period. Allowances must be made for changing “trend” levels. I will return to this in 
the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
14 Stiglitz (2000), p. 51 
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Figure 2: Evolution of gratio (disbursements/GDP) and tratio (revenues/GDP) 
1.5.3 The Stability and Growth Pact  
In 1999, the Euro was adopted in most of the (then) European Union countries. From this 
date, the monetary policy of the participating countries was conducted by the European 
Central Bank (ECB). An important part of the Monetary Union is the Stability and 
Growth Pact; this states that budget deficits shall not run below 3% of GDP.15 Though the 
rule has been widely criticized and the implementation may have been inconsequential16, 
it remains in effect, and could potentially have great impact on the ability to conduct 
fiscal policy. Provided that the sanction threats imposed by the EU are credible, there are 
now more limitations to the ability to run budget deficits in crises, and this could make 
countercyclical policy conductance harder. 
                                                 
15 “The Stability and Growth Pact”, European Commission Internet pages 
16 See, for example, De Grauwe (2003), p. 218 
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This push in the direction of less countercyclical policy may, however, be reversed by 
another important effect: as monetary policy is now conducted in a way assumed to be 
optimal for the entire Euro area, countries are left with only fiscal policy to solve their 
own problems. Several studies show that this effect has dominated17, and that although 
fiscal policy in the Euro area is still countercyclical, it has become less so after the 
introduction of the Stability and Growth pact. As the Stability and Growth pact period 
comprises such a small part of the time period studied in this dissertation, the effects will 
not be considered when analyzing the relationships.  
1.6 Summing up: Policy implications  
Above I have given a sketch of what I label the traditional Keynesian justification for 
countercyclical fiscal policy, as well as three possible objections: that fluctuations are 
optimal, that policy cannot alleviate the problems and that policy cannot be carried out in 
an ideal way.  
Classical theories emphasize the individual with its rational expectations, while 
Keynesian theory focuses on information problems among the same individuals, 
requiring government intervention. Defining policy-makers or even scholars into separate 
“schools” is an overt simplification, as most theories and opinions contain some forms of 
compromise. However, outlining the differences may be important for understanding the 
way these compromises are formed, and how much influence the theoretical “pure” 
arguments have. 
For the rest of this dissertation, I will use the above mentioned classification of 
Keynesian opinions, referring to the traditional, governance-optimistic Keynesian 
framework, and the non-Keynesian objections seen in contrast to this.  
1.6.1 Revealing government types  
The primary scope of this dissertation is to try to look behind the actions of governments; 
of all these theoretical implications, what do they deem most important? As explained 
above, the name Keynesian will refer to agents who use countercyclical policy, because 
                                                 
17 Galí and Perotti (2003), Marinheiro (2005) 
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they believe in Keynes, or the abilities of the government system, or both. If faced with a 
recession, these agents will tend to increase government expenditure or cut taxes to 
stimulate the economy. Equivalently, “procyclical” will refer to those who prefer not to 
act countercyclically; fiscal policy is rarely carried out in an entirely passive manner, and 
for the purpose of discerning the intentions this division is useful. Such a response could 
be motivated with theoretical arguments (reduced lifetime income, for example), with 
scepticism towards the possibilities of long-term planning, or by the fact that the 
decision-makers are the short-sighted politicians or bureaucrats some theories assume.   
Hypothesis 1A: Governments are Keynesian; recessions are met with expansionary 
fiscal policy 
Hypothesis 1B: Governments are procyclical; recessions do not lead to fiscal 
expansions 
1.6.2 The government budget constraint 
As mentioned above, governments do not have absolute liquidity constraints. Apart from 
the fact that money can be printed, governments in rich countries seldom have problems 
borrowing from private investors. Without this option, running countercyclical fiscal 
policy would be very hard. However, as debt increases the perceived chance of debt 
default may increase, and acquiring new debt becomes more expensive. The interest rates 
on existing debt also has to be paid, and becomes a significant part of public budgets. 
Thus, for countries with high public debt, the urge to spend more in recessions might be 
dampened by a lack of funds. As the debt grows, the probability of default becomes 
larger, and creates a pressure to reduce debt. This may cause the government to be more 
careful in fiscal expansions. 
For this reason, the influence of the debt level should be tested, as this is an important 
constraint when conducting fiscal policy. 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with a high debt/GDP ratio pursue a tighter fiscal policy  
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1.6.3 Decline of Keynesianism? 
Traditional Keynesian economics, with its strong focus on demand, postulates an active 
role for the government. During the second half of the twentieth century, these theories 
have been both challenged by and reconciled with other theories of fluctuations. 
Emphasis on monetary policy, the re-emergence of classical theory and focus on political 
economy could all be interpreted as reducing the Keynesian faith in fiscal policy.  
Economic policy is not directly dictated by scientists. However, the fluctuations in the 
economic debate of the last half of the twentieth century are too large to be ignored. It 
should not be too dramatic to assume that at least some of this has spilled over to policy, 
and that intervention-sceptic theories, less well-regarded in the 1950s, now play more 
important roles. I will therefore, with a broad pencil, interpret the prevailing view of 
fiscal policy in the period 1960-2000 as a decreasing trend; while the faith in economic 
policy reached an all-time high in the 1950s, its influence has decreased ever since.  
Hypothesis 3: During the course of the last half of the twentieth century, fiscal policy 
reflects a more governance-pessimistic trend; fiscal policy has become less 
countercyclical 
1.6.4 Ideological differences: Do they belong to different faiths? 
Are there any differences between the politicians? Do they act fundamentally different 
dependent on their political stance? As the classical lines of thoughts are explained 
above, it would not be too large a stretch to imagine that the theory is more popular 
among parties to the right of the political spectrum. The theory focuses on individual 
rationality, incorporates scepticism towards large government, and advocates against 
public spending in bad times. Indeed, the classical model is often perceived to be more 
popular among conservative political parties.18 Keynesian thoughts, on the other hand, 
have in many European countries been associated with social democratic governments in 
the post-war years, and may fit well with their agenda: emphasis on public works, faith in 
a rational government and a broader definition of what constitutes public goods. Thus, it 
                                                 
18 Burda and Wyplosz (2001), p. 406 
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would be of interest to see if conservative governments are less likely to use 
countercyclical policy than their social democratic counterparts.  
Hypothesis 4: Governments with foundations to the left of the political spectrum are 
more likely to lead a Keynesian fiscal policy 
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2 Measuring fiscal policy 
So far, I have used important parts of economic theory to lay out some hypotheses. This 
section will introduce the data with which the hypotheses will be tested, and the methods 
used to discern fiscal policy. 
2.1 Issues in fiscal policy indication 
2.1.1 Discretionary and induced revenues  
The simplest indicator of the fiscal policy stance, and the one traditionally used, is the 
unadjusted budget balance; income minus expenditure. However, this number contains 
information that is not directly related to fiscal policy; large parts of the budget cannot be 
controlled by the government on a day-to-day basis. A situation where tax programs, 
health care and unemployment benefits were decided for one year at a time would 
provide too much uncertainty and is not a realistic image of how economies work. For 
this reason, some work has gone into defining good indicators of discretionary policies, 
defined as a sort of “conscious” expansion of the budget; an expansion that the 
government is able to control. To discern this conscious part, a division of expenditures 
and revenues into discretionary and induced parts is useful; if policy is unchanged, only 
induced parts should change. One way of doing this would be to go through the budget 
for all years and read the policy statements. While it might be more accurate, such an 
approach could easily be manipulated (detecting a bias is harder) and would be hard to 
compare across countries. For this reason, I will focus on numerical indicators that are 
constructed in a transparent manner, with data that is comparable between countries. 
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There are several problems with constructing such an indicator. After all, the theoretical 
construction that one tries to discern is the intention of the government. The intention to 
perform a fiscal expansion may be hidden among a lot of other intentions, ranging over 
the entire spectrum of political activity, and a lot of tied-up parts of the budget. Decision-
makers may have incomplete information, and the results may differ from the intended 
effects. For this reason, the best we can aim for is to see what parts of changes in public 
expenditures that, any given year, are the result of discretionary policy. 
 
The indicators propose different ways to address this problem, and due to the different 
ways of constructing the numbers they often differ in times of economic crises, which is 
one reason why this dissertation devotes rather much attention to the various ways of 
indicating fiscal stance.  
The main use of these indicators in the literature has been evaluation of conducted 
policies; this is natural, given that economists should be quite interested in how the real 
                                                 
19 Data for Norway, using the discretionary budget balance as explained below. 
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world relates to their textbook models of fiscal policy. Some authors argue that the 
differences between the indicators are not of too great importance in this case20; I have 
not seen any clear documentation of this. In any case, the differences may lead to 
problems when using them as endogenous rather than exogenous variables; if, for 
example, unemployment is used to adjust tax revenues when compiling the indicator, 
unemployment could easily appear on both sides of the equality sign when running the 
regression. Therefore, it is of fundamental interest how the cyclical indicators of the 
economy affect the indicators; if the effects are direct, inaccuracies and measurement 
errors may be magnified. This is another reason for the following elaboration on the 
various ways of indicating the fiscal stance. 
2.1.2 Level or change? 
The number resulting from a one-dimensional fiscal indicator is either a flow term or an 
acceleration term, or, more precisely, the indicator measures either the level of spending 
(change in public debt) or the change in the level of spending (change in the change in 
public debt). Whether fiscal policy should be described as a level or a change depends on 
the model one are referring to; in a model with permanent effects of fiscal policy, a level 
indicator would be correct, whereas one would prefer a change indicator if one believed 
the effect was temporary. As this thesis does not aim to present one specific 
macroeconomic model, I will not focus too much on this, but these facts will be kept in 
mind. 
When considering expansions that take place over the course of several years, the level 
indicators may have an advantage; change indicators would then only show an expansion 
in the first year. In addition, change indicators will show expansions followed by 
contractions if discretionary spending returns to its previous value. Level indicators 
come, however, at a price: the need to define a base year – a year that has a “normal” 
budget. As government expenditure itself has changed during the period (all of these 
changes can hardly be said to be discretional), the choice of base year may affect the 
measure. Change indicators simply take the previous year as the benchmark year, 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995), p. 215 
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avoiding this problem, although the period over which the change is measured (usually 
one year) may be said to be arbitrary, and influence the conclusions.  
As I assume the fiscal indicators used in this thesis have been constructed to deal with the 
above problems in the best possible way, I will not interfere with the authors’ choice 
between level and change, except in the case of the OECD indicator, where both 
measures have been used officially by the OECD.21 The measures will be used as 
indicators of fiscal stance, and incorporated in my model in the same way.22 
2.1.3 Decomposing GDP 
Indicators have varying degrees of complexity. In this paragraph I will present a 
separation of revenues and expenses that will prove useful. The separation is in 
accordance with the way OECD organizes its data, and thus has the advantage of being 
easily accessible. Identifying which parts of revenues and expenditures that are 
discretionary is a central part of determining the fiscal policy stance. The composition is 
summarized below, with abbreviations taken from the OECD Economic Outlook for easy 
reference. 
Revenues and expenditures are decomposed as shown in Figures 4 and 5.  
TYH: Total direct taxes, households 
TYB: Total direct taxes, business 
TIND: Indirect taxes 
SSRG: Social security contributions received  





YPERG: Property income received 
YRGT: Total 
revenues 
TKTRG: Capital tax and transfer receipts 
Figure 4: Composition of public revenues 
                                                 
21 Blanchard (1990), p. 5 
22 Galí and Perotti (2003, p. 543) have a similar argument about not making a “final” choice between level 
and change indicators. 
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CGW: Government wages 
CGNW: Non-wage public consumption 
YPEPG: Property income paid by government 
TSUB: Subsidies 
UB: Unemployment benefits23 SSPG: Social 
security paid by 





TOCP: Other current payments 
IG: Public investment 
YPGT: Total 
expenditure 
(TKPG – CFKG): Capital transfers/payments minus government 
consumption of fixed capital 
Figure 5: Composition of public expenditure 
This decomposition is a good summary of the possible complexity of calculations, and it 
will be my reference point when dealing with some of the indicators. The data sources 
used are summarised in Appendix B. 
 
Even if indicators were fine-tuned to infer all thoughts of policy-makers from economic 
data, some disturbance would still exist. I here give some limitations which the methods 
used in this dissertation fail to address. 
One problem is that of time inconsistencies. Decisions that are taken one year are not 
necessarily effectuated the next year only; there may be delays, or the project may be 
large enough to last for several years. While an ideal approach could consider the 
decisions and not the results, I do not see how this could be done with a transparent, 
numeric procedure. 
Another issue is that public finance leaves room for some creative accounting. Though 
government budgets represent the actual financial situation pretty well, there are still 
some loopholes that some governments may be tempted to use. To mask deficits, 
property may be sold.24 Though an elimination of these effects has been attempted when 
constructed the indicators (capital revenues and expenditures are excluded from most of 
them), there could still be ways to do this, and this could be the case more often in years 
of large deficit. Therefore, a small bias may exist. There are also other ways to reduce 
deficits, such as devaluing property without exposing it to the market, as Portugal did 
                                                 
23 The division of SSPG into UB and “other” is not in the OECD Economic Outlook data. For a complete 
list of sources, see the appendix. 
24 Romer (2001), p. 533 
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with its gold reserve in 198025, or trying to push the bill on future generations. A switch 
to using capital as a basis for public budgets has been proposed. This would not count 
purchase of long-lasting capital equipment as expenditures, only the depreciation. 
However, the measurement problems related to such an approach would be quite large.26 
In some countries, large expansions may be undertaken through state-owned firms 
running large projects; this would not be included if one only looks at public expenditure. 
Such a factor is hard to adjust for, as it could vary greatly between countries.27  
2.2 The fiscal indicators 
This section presents a range of fiscal indicators. As the quantitative results of this thesis 
are quite sensitive to the choice of indicator, a careful presentation is deemed necessary.28 
2.2.1 The primary balance 
The easiest and most natural measure of fiscal stance is the primary balance – 
government revenues minus government expenditure excluding interest payments. Using 
this as a measure has the obvious advantage of simplicity and transparency. However, the 
issue of whether changes are discretionary or induced is not addressed, and therefore this 
is only useful if one wants to include automatic stabilizers.  




BALPRIMbal =  
BALPRIM is the primary balance, taken from the OECD data. The primary balance is 
government revenues minus government expenditures minus net interest payments. The 
indicator balr measures the change in net government debt. 
















                                                 
25 Giavazzi (1995), p. 241  
26 Gramlich (1989), p. 26 
27 Choraqui et al. (1990), p.4 
28 This section was initially inspired by a brief survey in Alesina and Perotti (1995), pp. 212-214 
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With these definitions, the balr (real balance) and dbalr (difference in real balance) 
indicators indicate, respectively, the relative budget balance and the relative change in the 
budget balance. 
2.2.2 The cyclically adjusted balance  
The measure advocated by the OECD is the cyclically adjusted budget balance, CAB. 
The calculation of the cyclical component of the budget balance can be summarized this 
way29: 
• The effects (that is, elasticities) of changes in output on tax income and 
expenditure are estimated. 
• On the basis of a theoretical model of the economy, country-specific production 
functions are constructed.  
These two components are then combined to find the cyclical component of the budget.30 
From this the cyclically-adjusted budget balance may be found. It is summarized by van 
den Noord (2000) as “the general government net borrowing or lending that would take 
place if the economy were operating at potential”. 
The CAB has been criticized for several reasons. According to Blanchard (1990), the 
CAB deals with issues that are “difficult, controversial, and completely irrelevant for the 
question at hand”31. The construction of potential output based on production functions is 
largely theoretical and will not always be correct. In addition, the use of elasticities of 
components relative to the entire output does not take into account changes in GDP 
composition. Finally, some criticism of the CAB concerns issues not relevant in my use 
of indicators, namely its (mis)use to indicate the sustainability of fiscal policy, its impact 
on aggregate demand and the effect on GDP composition32. 
Despite the criticism of the CAB, it remains an established measure of the policy stance, 
and, unlike other indicators, it can be given as a level measure. I will consider both the 
(scaled) value of the CAB in a given year, and the change from the year before, in 
accordance with the discussion in section 2.1.2. 
                                                 
29 van den Noord (2000), p. 5 
30 A calculation of the cyclical component is given in Appendix A.  
31 Blanchard (1990), p. 6 
32 Choraqui et al. (1990), p. 3 
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The OECD measure is also, with some minor adjustments, used by the IMF33 and the 
European Commission.34 




















The interpretation of the values are, similar to the balance indicators, that the cabr 
measure gives the relative, cyclically-adjusted, budget deficit, while the dcabr measure 
gives the change in this value.35 As for most of the remaining indicators, the values can 
be assumed to be lower than for the real balance, as automatic stabilizers are supposedly 
removed from the calculation.  
2.2.3 Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 
Blanchard (1990) presents a new way of indicating fiscal policy, designed to avoid the 
problems with the CAB. His “indicator of discretionary change” is calculated as the 
change in the budget balance (from one year to another) that would have been observed if 
unemployment had not changed.36  
Trend paths for taxes and transfers, adjusted for unemployment, are calculated and are 
used to correct the simple budget balance measure. Thus, some modelling is done, but the 
definition of “natural output” used in the CAB is avoided. The calculation of the 




where gp is government disbursements, gr is government revenues (both as shares of 
GDP and without interest payments and receipts) and s is a cyclical correction 
incorporating the changes in public budgets due to varying unemployment levels.  
                                                 
33 Alesina and Perotti (1995), p. 213 
34 Galí and Perotti (2003), p. 544 
35 The values in the OECD Economic Outlook data are in percent. The values used in my calculations are 
divided by 100 to get the relative numbers (100%=1) to be consistent with the other indicators. 
36 Blanchard (1990), p. 12 
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For consistence with the other indicators, an opposite scaling of the indicator will be used 




measuring the adjusted budget deficit size instead of the “expansionary-ness” of policy. 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse, (abbreviated as bfi for the remainder of this thesis) should 
also be expected to have a smaller volatility than the primary balance. This is the case, 
but just barely; in some cases, the adjustment actually leads to larger volatility (and larger 
outlier values) in predicted discretionary policy than in the unadjusted balance. 
2.2.4 Holden-Braconier indicator 
The definition proposed by Braconier and Holden (1999) and refined in Holden (2005) 
does, as the other indicators, set out to calculate the induced part of tax and expenditure 
changes; the part of public income and expenditures that is not directly affected by 
policy. 
When constructing the indicator, certain parts of the public budget are assumed not to be 
used in discretionary fiscal policy, as shown in Figure 6. The reasoning behind this is that 





SSRG  TSUB 









   
YPGT 
TKPG-CFKG 
Figure 6: Controllable and non-controllable components. Controllable components are shown in 
white 
 
Induced revenues are expected to grow proportional to the tax base. If T denotes total 
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Using a decomposed version of this formula, the induced change in revenues is calculated 
(See Appendix A for a full explanation). The discretionary change in revenues is then 






t TTT ∆−∆=∆  





Tt ∆=∆ . 
The Holden-Braconier indicator uses a decomposed version of GDP, aiming for greater 
accuracy. Changes in discretionary policy may also be calculated for parts of the budget, 
such as household taxes, enabling a more detailed analysis. However, this attempted 
accuracy is also one reason to be critical; in particular, the data on the tax bases and the 
assumptions of their growth may not be a perfect fit, and, as mentioned above, 
measurement errors in the cyclical indicators (most notably unemployment) could be 
magnified as these are also included in the fiscal policy indicator. 
 
The calculation of the expenditure side is slightly different than the revenue side, due to 
the nature of unemployment benefits. The induced unemployment benefit expenditure (as 
a share of trend GDP) is assumed to fluctuate with the unemployment rate, while other 
expenditures fluctuate with total production. The calculation procedure is explained in 
Appendix A. Having calculated the induced change in expenditure for unemployment 















Gg ∆=∆  
The situation in this case is, as for the Blanchard indicator, that unemployment actually is 
a part of the indicator. Any correlation between the indicator and unemployment 
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therefore has to be examined with special care. As discussed in section 2.1.1 above, one 
consequence of this may be an increase in possible measurement errors.  
 
The calculated change in the discretionary budget balance, which is the Holden-







t gtb ∆−∆=∆  
This change should, in theory, be “cleaned” of the effects of automatic stabilization. 
The Holden-Braconier indicator, abbreviated as dbd for the remainder of the thesis, 
shows more variation than the other change indicators.  
2.2.5 The discretionary budget balance  
In this paragraph I will try to develop a level indicator. This is partially an extension of 
the Holden-Braconier indicator, with three clear objectives: Trying to remove 
unemployment from entering directly into the calculation, not having to rely on too many 
data sources, and getting an indicator in level form. The basic way of solving this is to 
divide the budget components into discretionary and non-discretionary parts; instead of 
de-trending growth in some variables, I choose to assume that some parts of the budget 
can serve as indicators of discretionary policy.  
 
I simplify the expenditure calculation by assuming that the entire automatic stabilizer 
effect is part of the social security expenditures. When an expansive fiscal policy is 
conducted, it is unlikely that it will be done in such a way as to increase social security 
expenditure, as the target of the expansion is increased economic activity. For fiscal 
contractions the picture may be a bit more clouded, but I still think it is a reasonable 
assumption. The part of the budget that may be used for expansionary policy is thus 
SSPGIGYPGGother −+= )(  
subtracting SSPG from the G used in the Holden-Braconier indicator.37 
                                                 
37 It is thus assumed that CGW, CGNW, YPEPG, TSUB, TOCP and IG are controlled by the government, 
and not part of the automatic stabilizers. In the following calculation, G refers to this entity. 
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Then, I calculate a “normal” level of public expenditure, using the previous five years as 
base years. The choice of moving base year makes comparison between countries easier, 
but has two drawbacks: The loss of the first five observations and a certain inaccuracy as 
five years is not enough. The choice of a five-year base period is chosen as a balance 
between these two issues. 
The calculation of the indicator is done by postulating a “trend” or induced level of public 
expenditure, as shown in Appendix A. The relative difference between this trend level 
and the actual level of public expenditure (for the parts of the budget defined above) thus 





GGg −=  
 
An aggregated revenue indicator can be constructed in the same way as the expenditure 
indicator. When considering revenues, however, assuming a constant tax rate is more 
appropriate than assuming a constant tax income level.  
I will develop two ways of calculating discretionary revenues, with their separate 
advantages. In the most straightforward version, roughly the same share of GDP as for 
revenues is considered:  
SSRGYPERGYRGT other −−= )( 38 




and the trend variable for this is constructed, as described in the appendix, and multiplied 





TTt −=   
For a closer resemblance to the Holden-Braconier indicator, and the possibility of a more 
detailed decomposition, I have also devised a more complex indicator. This is calculated 
by generating a “tax policy regime”, using the same division as in the Holden-Braconier 
                                                 
38 The discretionary revenue (called T from now on) is thus postulated to consist of TYH, TYB, TIND and 
TOCR.  
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indicator, by dividing tax income in each sector by its tax base (see Appendix A for a full 
description). The tax rate for the five preceding years is then used to calculate a trend tax 
rate system, and this tax system, used on this year’s tax bases, constitutes induced public 








TTt −=  
The correlation between the two revenue indicators is approximately .91 for the data used 
in this dissertation. Why, then, stay with two ways of calculating discretionary revenues? 
The advantage of the complex calculation is that it includes more information. Tax base 
data is utilized, aiming for more accuracy. However, this may also be a drawback; the 
simple calculation relies only on aggregated income and expenditure data, and has a more 
transparent calculation. I will return to an evaluation of the different indicators below.  
 
The total budget balance is calculated as for Holden-Braconier, that is 
DDD gtb −=  




c gtb −=  
When abbreviated, bd and bdc will be used for these indicators in the rest of this thesis. 
The values are slightly more volatile than the balance (both unadjusted and cyclically-
adjusted) as only parts of the budgets are included. 
2.2.6 Relations between the fiscal indicators  
As shown above, the indicators use different approaches to separate discretionary and 
induced revenues. The OECD indicator (CAB) assumes the induced balance to change 
according to estimated effects when output deviates from potential. Blanchard’s Fiscal 
Impulse (bfi) gives induced effects that fluctuate with unemployment. The Holden-
Braconier indicator (dbd) assumes that proportional growth in tax bases and tax income 
gives induced revenues, while a constant disbursement/GDP ratio gives induced 
expenditures if cyclically corrected. The discretionary budget balance calculation gives 
the induced balance to be the balance that would follow from trend tax rates and 
expenditures for parts of the budget not related to social security. 
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To discuss some of the differences between the indicators, I will outline some possible 
effects of a recession and what the indicators say about the expected induced changes.  
 
The CAB, with an emphasis on potential output, will react in different ways depending 
on the estimation of potential output. Compared to regular “demand” shocks, a “supply-
side” shock also lowers potential output will affect the OECD measure comparatively 
less, giving little cyclical adjustment. If the automatic stabilisers do not differentiate 
between these kinds of shocks, and adjust according to increased unemployment, the 
CAB could characterise a larger part of the response as discretionary than the other 
indicators. Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse, on the other hand, is exclusively unemployment-
oriented. This could lead to an over-adjustment in times of high trend unemployment, 
characterising a larger part of the budget as induced.  
The Holden-Braconier indicator uses both information on unemployment and the cycle 
(tax bases), and thereby tries to balance these issues. The discretionary budget balance, 
by using trends, tries to avoid some of the problems, but the trending used gives an 
under-sensivity to “slow” cycles; after five years of output below trend, the bd (and bdc) 
would have adjusted, gradually removing the cyclical adjustment and expanding the 
discretionary part. 
 
An economic shock also has effects on the composition of the economy. Unemployment 
benefits increase in recessions, but other benefits, such as sick leave, may also increase. 
The calculations of induced spending will differ; Blanchard and Holden-Braconier would 
classify such a change as a discretionary increase in government spending, while the 
discretionary budget balance has explicitly removed social security from the calculation. 
Many other sector-limited shocks would presumably be handled more accurately by the 
decomposition methods used by the dbd and bdc; as mentioned above, the OECD 
indicator can be criticised for estimating responses to fluctuations in aggregate GDP. A 
similar argument can be made against the bfi and bd constructions. 
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I will return to this issue, and the effects on the overall estimations, in chapter 3. The 
indicators diverge in their classification of responses to changes in the economy, the 
reason for why I include all of them in this thesis.  
 
A table of the correlations between the indicators may be found in the appendix. 
Correlations show a wide range; for example, Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse is almost 
perfectly correlated with the primary balance (.96) while the discretionary budget balance 
and the CAB hardly show correlation at all (.02). Figure 7 shows the fluctuations of the 
different indicators for one of the countries in the sample. 
 
2.3 Economic and political environment 
2.3.1 Defining the business cycle  
Estimating if the economy is in recession or boom is, naturally, a central part of 
economics. The choices are not as many here as for the fiscal indicators, so the discussion 
will be a bit briefer, but the choice is still important. Below follows a brief summary of 
the two measures that are most frequently used: unemployment and output gap. 
 
Though using unemployment as a cyclical indicator has some limitations, notably an 
unclear relation to total production and large differences between countries, the 
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Figure 7: Examples of fluctuations of fiscal indicators (Italy, 1960-2004) 
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unemployment can be assumed to be known to governments at any given time, being an 
important motivation for unemployment-reducing policy. Also, while “growth” may be 
an abstract concept in the short run and is neutral with respect to distributional issues, low 
unemployment usually means greater equity and an improvement also in the short run. 
Unemployment statistics may be incomplete in some countries, as people stop looking for 
labour or drift into the “black” economy. The black economy is, however, an issue for all 
indicators and not only limited to measuring of unemployment. 
 
The output gap (GDP gap) measure used by the OECD is meant to give an indication of 
the current stance of the economy. A natural level of activity is estimated; what output 
would have been given some “natural” state.39 A lot of calculation goes into the indicator, 
of which little will be reproduced here.40 Among the variables included are the size of the 
government and private sectors, the total number of hours worked, an estimate of 
productivity, the stock of capital and the size of the potential work force. Another vital 
variable is the NAWRU, the “natural unemployment rate” that is consistent with a 
theoretical economic equilibrium.  
When the natural output level is found, the GDP gap is calculated as the difference 
between observed and natural output. The GDP gap measure is advanced, and is assumed 
to give a good indication of the state of the economy. This comes at the price of reduced 
transparency; the calculation of the GDP gap is complicated, and the indicator may not be 
known to the authorities when they set policy. 
 
When indicating the cyclical stance, I aim to balance the transparency of unemployment 
with some of the theoretical foundations of the output gap measure. As labour markets 
differ widely across countries, unemployment data will be normalized using the natural 
level, the NAWRU. As the right-hand side of the equations (the fiscal indicators) are 
quite elaborated, simplicity on the right-hand side will make the interpretations of the 
results a bit more straightforward.  
                                                 
39 Though the concepts are not entirely separate, the “natural” output level used in the GDP gap calculation 
is not equivalent to the “natural” output mentioned when discussing Keynesian and classicist theory. The 
OECD definition has a more empirical approach. 
40 The OECD GDP gap calculation may be found in its entirety in Giorno et. al. (1995) 
 Is Fiscal Policy Keynesian? 33 
 
The cyclical measure used thus becomes 
NAWRUUU gap −=  
 
A table of correlations between the cyclical indicators and between the cyclical indicators 
and the fiscal indicators is given in the appendix. The unemployment gap is placed 
“between” the unemployment rate and the output gap, showing the highest correlation 
with both.  
2.3.2 Assessing the political stance   
Data on the political stance of governments is taken from a data set compiled by Michael 
McDonald and Silvia Mendes.41 The data set contains a wide range of data on the 
strength and position of governments in key Western countries from the early 1950s to 
1995. Care should of course be taken when compressing thoughts into a left-right scale 
this way. Though the data appears to be thoroughly researched, I have checked it against 
two other political data sources (Swank and Ardagna) that are calculated in a less 
efficient way42 and found correlations of .75 and .65. Comparisons between the indicators 
are also presented below. I find the agreement between the indicators satisfactory.  
 
                                                 
41 Available from http://www.binghamton.edu/polsci/research/mcdonalddata.htm 
42 Both data sets classify parties as “right”, “center”, or “left”, while McDonald / Mendes use a continuous 
scale. The GOVLR3 indicator is compared with the following: The Swank indicator was created by 
subtracting the share of “left” parties in government from the “right” ones (rightg – leftg). In the Ardagna 
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Figure 8: Comparing cyclical indicators 
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The data file is grouped by government, so some work has gone into converting it to 
compatible country-year format.43 In years with several governments in office, a 
weighted average of the values has been used, based on the parties holding office at the 
end of each month. Some short-lived governments do not have indicators of political 
stance; in these cases, the average of the months with known values is used.  
The variables of relevance for this thesis are 
Government position: I have chosen to use the variable McDonald and Mendes call 
GOVLR3. This gives the left-right position of the government currently in power on a 
theoretical scale from -100 (left) to 100 (right); the lowest and highest observations are 
-36 and 46, respectively. This number is based on information in Budge et al. (2001), 
giving the policy stance of political parties based on their election manifestos, using mean 
values for coalition governments (each party is weighted by the number of posts they 
control44). The indicator is calculated using a three-election average where data is 
available.45 Figure 10 shows the measured political range of the different governments in 
the countries studied. 
Government strength: The indicator used for this will be the ratio of parliament seats 
the governing parties hold. This is called GOVSPCT in the data set (GPSPCT in the 
explanations in the codebook). 
 
                                                 
43 Excel macro available on request. 
44 Budge et al (2001), p. 166 
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Figure 9: Comparing political data 
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Data for Japan and Greece are not available, while Spain and Portugal only have data 
from after democratisation in the 1970s. The data set covers observations up to 1995, 
giving a total of 611 observations. 
Figure 10 gives the range of the left-right specification of the various countries according 
to the McDonald / Mendes data. 
 
 
Figure 10: Range of left-right specification, by country  
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3 Looking for Answers  
Having presented my hypotheses and the data to be used in testing, it is now time to 
confront reality. The data I use (T=44, N=20) presents a rather wide and long panel, and I 
will begin this section with a discussion of the panel data estimation methods available.  
3.1 Choice of estimation 
3.1.1 The baseline model 
The postulated relation between fiscal stance, cyclical situation and debt will be 
ittititi ZUF εγβα +++= −− 1,1,,  
where  
• F is the discretionary fiscal stance, calculated by one of the indicators described in 
Part Two 
• U is unemployment (adjusted using NAWRU, as specified in section 2.3.1) used 
as a cyclical indicator 
• Z is the ratio of government debt to GDP. 
The exogenous variables chosen are the ones deemed most necessary; the theoretical 
framework used in this dissertation does not justify any other right-hand-side variables. 
Though other relations are probably present, they are beyond the scope of this thesis and 
may be hard to quantify. 
 
Initially, I will assume that the effects on fiscal policy are the same in all countries over 
the entire time period. As this assumption has some drawbacks, as will be explained 
below, separate regressions for countries and decades will also be run. These separate 
regressions are also interesting when studying differences between countries and time 
periods. 
 
I have chosen to use the lagged values of the exogenous variables in the regressions. This 
means that policy in time t is assumed to be affected by the state of the economy in time 
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t-1. This fits well with the fact that making decisions and carrying them out takes some 
time; one year may be a good approximation of this. Using the lagged values of the 
exogenous variables can also help alleviate a possible causality problem. When looking at 
the data for the same year, it is hard to know whether the fiscal policy is the result of the 
economic situation or if the economic situation is a result of fiscal policy. By using 
lagged values of the economic situation, some of this problem is avoided, though 
forecasts for t+1 may still be an input to decision makers in time t.46 These forecasts, 
however, will be based on the situation in time t, and thus the lagging of variables should 
provide a reliable way of ensuring the correct causality. 
3.1.2 Previous results  
Though there is an abundance of works on ways fiscal policy works, and how it affects 
the economy, this is not the case when considering the effects of cyclical variation on 
fiscal policy. I have only found a few related results: Galí (2004), using the cyclically 
adjusted balance, finds that fiscal policy is systematically countercyclical, and has 
become increasingly more so. This point is also made in Galí and Perotti (2003). Fatás 
and Mihov (2001) discuss effects of cyclical variation on various fiscal variables, but do 
not use any explicit fiscal indicator. They find that the primary balance is countercyclical. 
Braconier and Holden (1999) examine effects on public finance (budget surpluses and 
deficits) of cyclical variations if fiscal policy is held constant, and find that the sensivity 
varies some within the Nordic countries. 
Below, I will discuss some of the methods used in previous works, to find an appropriate 
way of estimating the relationships. 
3.1.3 Pooling data: Choosing the appropriate estimator 
Initially, I will assume that the effects on fiscal policy are the same in all countries. An 
argument can be made that this restriction may lead to biased estimators47 as it is hard to 
test if equal slopes are present in the “true” case. For this reason, some works on the topic 
of fiscal adjustments, such as Hogan (2004) use an average of country-specific slope 
                                                 
46 Kennedy (2003), p. 74-75 
47 Pesaran and Smith (1995), p. 80, Kennedy (2003), p. 311. 
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estimates. However, using only separate estimations (as I will do later to look at country-
specific effects) uses less information to produce the estimate. I will give these efficiency 
gains the most attention, and, in accordance with Baltagi et al (2000) and Attanasio et al 
(2000) estimate using all the data. This is by no means a unique approach in these kinds 
of works; it is used, for example, in Fatás and Mihov (2001).  
The characteristics of the various t and i groups can be incorporated in various ways.48 It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to formulate any explicit model of the causes of various 
fiscal actions in different countries and years. For this reason, I choose to represent the 
groups by dummy variables, rather than by variables constructed from indicators of 
institutional structure, development and other such factors. In the case of country 
dummies, this is equivalent to the fixed effects estimator.49 The inclusion of year 
dummies as well generates another “layer” of controls; thus, effects only caused by the 
passage of time should be removed. Some degrees of freedom are lost, but the 
observations are numerous enough to justify this. Any remaining significant results 
should now be a good indicator of the true relation, despite the possibility of a small bias 
as indicated above.   
The equation to be estimated with regular OLS thus becomes50 
itUKUKAustriaAustriatititi DDDDZUF εϕϕφφγβα +++++++++= −− ...... 20032003196019601,1,,  
 
A common choice when conducting panel data estimates is between this fixed effects 
estimator and the random effects estimator. I have chosen the fixed effects estimator 
here for several reasons. First, the groups can be said to be “complete”; the sample 
includes most of the countries that have been members of the OECD for the entire time 
period. One of the advantages of the random effects model is most prominent when the 
groups used are chosen as “samples” of a larger population,51 while this thesis contains 
almost all countries that have been OECD members for most of the time period. Also, the 
fixed effects estimator is better when facing a possible omitted variable bias, which is 
                                                 
48 Baltagi et al (2000), p. 119 present an easily accessible list. 
49 Kennedy (2003), p. 304 
50 In this example, 2004 and the US are omitted. I will let the software choose the year and code that should 
not have a dummy.  
51 Judge et al (2001), p. 359 
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indeed the case here; I do not propose to have every country-specific characteristic 
included. When considering asymptotic analysis, making the time periods go towards 
infinity seems to make a lot more sense than assuming that the number of OECD 
countries approaches infinity, another argument for using the fixed effects estimator.52 
Finally, Hausman tests on the fixed and random effects estimators have not been 
conclusive, another reason to choose the fixed effects estimator53. 
 
With these estimation methods, I will now go through the hypotheses and see if any 
significance can be found.  
3.2 Responses to fluctuations (H1) 
3.2.1 Primary result: Non-Keynesian policy 
Using the above panel data analysis method on the various fiscal indicators yields the 
results found in Table 1.54 Figure 11 shows 95% intervals for the unemployment gap 
coefficients. 
 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in primary balance 0.0013 0.043 0.0139 0.001 0.2940 554 
Change in CAB -0.0011 0.068 0.0136 0.001 0.1833 529 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0017 0.007 0.0149 0.000 0.2738 562 
Holden-Braconier -0.0001 0.847 0.0104 0.098 0.1972 453 
Level indicators:     
Primary balance -0.0063 0.000 0.0318 0.000 0.4513 558 
CAB -0.0019 0.059 0.0360 0.000 0.4895 542 
Discretionary budget balance 0.0050 0.017 0.0189 0.226 0.3620 520 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0062 0.003 -0.0040 0.774 0.4075 490 
Coefficients in bold are significant on a 95% level.  
Table 1: OECD-wide results 
                                                 
52 Kennedy (2003), p. 316 
53 Kennedy (2003) argues that the random effects estimator should be chosen when the null of unsystematic 
difference in coefficients clearly cannot be rejected, and the fixed effects estimator otherwise. 
54 The STATA command is <xi: reg [fiscal indicator] [unemployment gap, t-1] [debt ratio, t-1] i.year 
i.code>. Intercepts and dummy coefficients omitted. Regression logs are available on request. 
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All the significant indicators are consistent: Fiscal policy is not conducted counter-
cyclically. An increase in unemployment leads to discretionary fiscal tightening. 
According to the discretionary budget balance, an increase in unemployment gap of one 
percentage point would lead to a tightening of financial policy by about half as much. 
Estimation using Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse predicts an effect of about .17%. The 
Holden-Braconier indicator hardly predicts any tendency at all. Differences in magnitude 
are partly due to the different ways the indicators are constructed, as discussed in chapter 
2; the sign of the effects is the primary concern here. 
Note that the cyclically adjusted balance, while not significantly different from zero, hints 
that these results are indicator-dependent. When sticking to the OECD way of measuring 
fiscal policy, Keynesianism seems to be the strongest tendency. The results must 
therefore be carefully interpreted. 
 
That the discretionary budget balance predicts the largest responses of fiscal policy to 
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a more volatile result; in addition, the removal of social security expenditures could in 
some cases lead to a bias towards classical policy for this indicator. That the CAB yields 
near-significant Keynesian results should be noted; this suggests that the approach used 
by the OECD is different from the other options. Based on the discussion in chapter 2, 
one could interpret this difference as a focus on output rather than unemployment among 
governments; after all, the unemployment-focused Blanchard indicator shows a more 
non-Keynesian tendency.  
 
The 2R -values are generally higher for the level indicators. Does this, and the fact that 
the change in balance indicator shows an unexpected result (automatic stabilizers should 
work the other way, as the level indicator shows) imply that the lag of one year is 
incorrectly chosen? To control for this, I have run some estimations for the change 
indicators without the lag on the right-hand side, and the fit does not improve.55 
Therefore, I will not change my assumption that one-year lags are most appropriate. 
 
Though the results above point in different directions, my preliminary conclusion will be 
that non-Keynesian theory fits government behaviour best; a recession is met with a 
tightening of public finance. All significant results show the same effect, and, as pointed 
out in chapter 2, the use of the CAB as an indicator in this framework has been 
criticised.56 
3.2.2 Automatic stabilizers 
How automatic stabilizers work is not the scope of this thesis. However, a short 
discussion can be made, as the primary balance includes both induced and discretionary 
policy. Combined, these clearly show Keynesian properties, as the coefficient for balr 
(the primary balance level) shows. This should be expected, as the induced effects should 
work countercyclically and thus give a coefficient lower than the discretionary effects 
that the other indicators try to capture. According to the regression results, an increase in 
                                                 
55 Similar regressions run with zero- and two-period lags on the right hand side; no systematic difference in 
coefficient significance or R-squared-values. Results are available on request. 
56 Blanchard (1990), p. 6  
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the unemployment gap of one percentage point would increase the budget deficit by .63 
percentage points the following year.  
When looking at the change in the primary deficit (dbalr), however, no Keynesian 
effects are found. This may imply that effects actually take more than one year to affect 
the economy. As mentioned above, another possible explanation would be that the use of 
one-year change values on the left-hand side is actually not a good solution, and that the 
level indicators are better. 
3.2.3 Country-specific estimates: Low significance     
To relax the restriction of equal coefficients across countries, I have also run simple OLS 
regressions for the separate countries. When considering the countries separately, there 
are fewer observations for each regression, and significant results are therefore harder to 
find. Indeed, for some indicators, coefficients significantly different from zero are hardly 
present.57 
 
The discussions in this section will mainly be centred on the coefficients estimated by the 
cyclically adjusted balance and the discretionary budget balance, as these yield the 
clearest results and, in most cases, represent minimum and maximum values of the 
estimates. Figure 12 shows the significant coefficients obtained using the various 
indicators, while Figure 13 compares the results obtained using cab and bd. 
                                                 
57 The regression method (in STATA) is <by country: reg [fiscal indicator] [cyclical indicator, t-1] 
debtratio, t-1>. Tables of coefficients significantly different from zero are found in the appendix. 
Regression outputs are available on request. 
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Figure 12: Unemployment gap coefficients significantly different from zero  
As discussed in the previous section, the CAB shows a more Keynesian tendency than the 
other indicators. In this case, only the Netherlands is significantly classified as non-
Keynesian, while eleven other countries show up with Keynesian policy. Among these 
are several countries with large welfare states (implying a preference for larger 
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government?) such as three of the Scandinavian countries, but also countries which can 
be perceived to be more conservative, such as the United States.  
The discretionary budget balance measure appears more inclined to show countries as 
classicist. 58 Only Portugal comes across as a country with Keynesian policies for all 
indicators. 
 
The following discussion only takes into account the CAB and the discretionary budget 
balance as shown in Figure 13. 
The Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and Norway) appear to have the same 
degree of countercyclical policy when a CAB estimation is used. This may be expected 
for countries with large welfare states; one could expect a strong emphasis on the adverse 
                                                 
58 There are no systematic differences between the two ways of calculating this here; therefore, only the 
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Figure 13: Different coefficients using the OECD measure and the discretionary balance (significant 
and non-significant results) 
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effects of unemployment. However, “big government” should also work as an automatic 
stabiliser, reducing the need for discretionary fiscal policy. From the results, it would 
appear that the former effect is strongest, giving a relatively countercyclical policy in 
these countries. Finland, another country with similar characteristics, does not, however, 
share this result. When estimating using the discretionary budget balance, the spread is 
wider and the results are not significant.  
Three large European countries (Germany, France, and the UK) show similar 
characteristics with both the discretionary budget balance and the CAB; they appear to be 
moderately procyclical. I do not have any good explanation for this; constraints not 
discussed in this thesis might have similar effects in these countries. Italy and Spain could 
be said to be in the same category, but show similar characteristics only when estimating 
with the discretionary budget balance. The United States, which should be considered a 
group of its own, shows some of the same characteristics as the large European countries.  
Smaller European countries appear more scattered in the figure. Belgium and the 
Netherlands share almost the same coefficient when a discretionary budget balance 
estimate is used, but are more apart when using the CAB. Austria is one of the countries 
with the largest spread between the estimates; however, only the CAB is significantly 
different from zero. Portugal appears to be a case of its own; the only country that is 
predicted to be Keynesian by all indicators. It should be noted that the estimate is based 
on fewer observations than for the other countries. 
I will not group the non-European countries here. Japan is estimated to be the most pro-
cyclical country by the discretionary budget balance, while the CAB predicts it as one of 
the most countercyclical. Japan has experienced relatively slow cyclical movements; this 
could mean that the trending used in the discretionary budget balance would have time to 
adjust in a long recession, for example, while the CAB, emphasising theoretical potential 
output, would not. Such differences in calculations could explain the large differences in 
the estimated coefficients for Japan. 
 
The total effect (Keynesian or not) still seems to be indicator-dependent. The OECD 
estimates use country-specific production functions, while the other indicators use the 
same procedures for all countries; this is likely to be one of the reasons for the deviations. 
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As the CAB stands out in a separate direction, while the other indicators (Blanchard, the 
discretionary budget balance and mostly the Holden-Braconier indicator) agree, I will 
focus on the effects from the latter. If this is done, we can agree that non-Keynesian 
results dominate. I will therefore maintain my conclusion from the previous section; that 
pro-cyclical tendencies dominate, but that the results are not unequivocally confirmed. 
There is obviously a need for further research in this field, a fact that I will return to in 
the concluding section. 
3.3 Constrained by debt (H2) 
The debt constraint hypothesis, saying that higher debt/GDP-ratios lead to tighter fiscal 
policy, is confirmed. The results that are significantly different from zero are summarized 
in Figure 14.59 No significant results were found for dbalr or dbd. 
                                                 
59 Tables of significant coefficients are found in the appendix, in the same tables as the unemployment 
coefficients. 
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Figure 14: Effects of debt/GDP ratio on fiscal policy, significant results, by country 
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All significant results predict that an increased debt/GDP-ratio lead to a tighter fiscal 
policy, the only exception being a few results for Finland, Japan and New Zealand. 
Increased debt also constrains the overall budget; all the significant coefficients for balr 
are above zero. Countries with high debt could either be assumed to run high deficits (if 
that was why debt was high initially; that some countries run high deficits and 
accumulate high debt) or low deficits (that countries that have acquired the debt in the 
past now act responsibly to get rid of the debt). The sign of the coefficients for the 
primary balance shows that the latter is more correct; countries with high debt run a 
tighter fiscal policy. 
As shown in Figure 1 (on page 10), gross public debt is not equally volatile for all 
countries. Countries such as Norway, with low significance, have a stable level of public 
debt; this might be the reason for the low significance of the estimates. The use of gross 
rather than net debt also discards some information; some countries (again Norway) have 
large assets that would alleviate problems of high debt. I have, however, chosen to stick 
with the gross value, as data are more reliable. 
The fact that public debt is shown to constrain fiscal policy is also a vote of confidence 
for the indicators; the effects go in the expected direction. As shown in Table 2 below, 
these results also hold when dividing the data into different time periods. 
3.4 Historical development (H3)  
In the discussion above, though I have relaxed the restriction of constant coefficients 
among countries, constant coefficients in different time periods have not been considered. 
This will be done in this section. I start by defining four distinct time periods, and 
proceed to examine the parameter values in these periods. To keep the number of 
coefficients manageable, I will reinstate the restriction that coefficients are equal among 
countries, but still assume different intercepts, using the fixed effects estimator with year 
dummies as explained in section 3.1.2. 
 
When looking for changes over time, one approach could be to do cross-section estimates 
for each year, and compare the results. Such estimates yield little significance; an 
indication that short-term fluctuations in the coefficients are not correlated between 
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countries. As I am interested in more long-term changes, I have decided to group the data 
into decades. Rather than breaking the data off arbitrarily (at round numbers, for 
example), I have chosen to divide the series at some fairly important economic events. I 
will divide the time period for which I have data, 1960-2004, at the following points: 
1973. The end of the Bretton Woods system removed the United States dollar as the sole 
key currency of the world.60 In addition, conflicts in the Middle East lead to the oil crisis 
in the fall of 1973, interrupting the spectacular growth seen in the OECD era for several 
decades, and accelerating inflation.61  
1983. In the beginning of the 1980s, Western economies started to overcome the woes of 
stagflation. In addition, increased liberalisation, particularly marked by the conservative 
turns in the UK and US, lead to deregulation. International financial deregulation, 
combined with the computer revolution, lead to a sharp increase in international financial 
trade.62  
1993. The breakdown of the EMS in 1992-93 lead to changes in the possibilities of 
monetary policy. This probably affected the use of fiscal policy. At the same time, 
increased European integration in other fields led to less political and economic 
independence for many countries. 
This gives 1960-1972, 1973-1982, 1983-1992, and 1993-2004 as the time periods used. 
 
The results are presented in Table 2. Figure 15 shows the evolution of the coefficients in 
the last three time periods (the first, 1960-72, has very few observations). 
 
 
                                                 
60 Palmer and Colton (1995), p. 903 
61 Palmer and Colton (1995), pp. 992 - 993 
62 Palmer and Colton (1995), p. 999 




 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in CAB 0.0045 0.484 -0.0130 0.943 0.7034 20 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0047 0.305 -0.1812 0.140 0.6000 31 
Holden-Braconier 0.0006 0.899 -0.1598 0.226 0.6601 31 
Level indicators:     
CAB 0.0002 0.950 -0.3219 0.006 0.9178 26 
Discretionary budget balance -0.0021 0.915 -1.3018 0.013 0.5723 31 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0232 0.207 -0.0737 0.800 0.5954 34 
 
1973-1982 
 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in CAB -0.0021 0.338 0.0046 0.854 0.2829 106 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0005 0.792 0.0318 0.152 0.3453 128 
Holden-Braconier -0.0030 0.144 0.0251 0.288 0.2641 116 
Level indicators:     
CAB -0.0021 0.292 -0.0658 0.005 0.7763 113 
Discretionary budget balance 0.0003 0.959 0.0426 0.590 0.5319 108 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0000 0.998 -0.0618 0.396 0.5657 105 
 
1983-1992 
 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in CAB -0.0031 0.010 0.0718 0.000 0.2994 166 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0008 0.548 0.0951 0.000 0.3762 166 
Holden-Braconier -0.0011 0.472 0.0481 0.042 0.2944 140 
Level indicators:     
CAB -0.0032 0.029 0.0795 0.000 0.6705 166 
Discretionary budget balance 0.0034 0.410 0.0800 0.208 0.3781 156 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0028 0.490 0.0261 0.670 0.4547 142 
 
1993-2004 
 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in CAB -0.0007 0.375 0.0219 0.005 0.2278 237 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0017 0.094 0.0225 0.016 0.3526 237 
Holden-Braconier 0.0001 0.936 0.0178 0.297 0.1905 166 
Level indicators:     
CAB -0.0036 0.001 0.0201 0.040 0.7912 237 
Discretionary budget balance 0.0057 0.080 -0.0072 0.810 0.3563 225 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0074 0.026 -0.0069 0.817 0.4000 209 
Coefficients in bold are significant on a 95% level. 
Table 2: Effects on fiscal policy, by decade 
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As is shown, this coarse division shows little significance; a clear historical development 
cannot be found. The only fiscal indicator to show significant results for two consecutive 
periods is the CAB in the two last decades, hinting at a small shift towards more 
Keynesian policy. This is in accordance with Galí and Perotti (2003). If I look at the 
estimates that do not fulfil the significance requirements, this trend is not confirmed; all 
the other indicators yield parameters that show trends away from countercyclical 
responses. As I have suggested in previous sections that the CAB is biased towards 
Keynesian policy, an argument could be made that Hypothesis 3 is at least weakly 
supported; theories that do not support demand management may have gained some 
ground.  
 
The results from this section are not strong enough to conclude. The fact that policy does 
not show a clear trend towards classicism is interesting in itself, given the increased 
popularity such theories have gained among economists. One should also note that an 
















   
   
   



















Figure 15: Estimates of effect on fiscal policy, by decade. Significant results marked 
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the emphasis on various indicators shows underlying trends that go in the opposite 
direction. 
3.5 Influence of ideologies (H4) 
To test whether the political stance of governments matters for fiscal policy, I have first 
divided the observations according to which governments held power. Defining 
observations between -5 and 5 on the McDonald / Mendes scale as “centrist” and 
observations smaller than -12 and larger than 12, respectively, as “left” and “right”, I get 
five approximately equally sized groups, as shown in Figure 16. The same panel data 
estimates as above have been performed on these groups. 
The usual divergence of the coefficient estimates according to indicator clouds the picture 
here as well, but the “centre/right” governments (5 to 12 on McDonald / Mendes scale) 
stands out as particularly pro-cyclical. For this case, the CAB and the discretionary 
budget balance yield significant results.   
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This question may be more formally analysed by including a political stance variable in 
the regression. To analyse the effects of political stance on the conductance of fiscal 
policy, I also include an interaction variable between political stance and unemployment 
gap. The modified equation becomes 
( ) ittitititititi ZGUGUF εγζψβα ++⋅+++= −−−−− 1,1,1,1,1,,  
where G indicates the political stance of the government (positive values indicate 









; the effect on the conductance of 
fiscal policy of fluctuations in the political stance of the government. 
 
                                                 




















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

















Figure 16: Coefficient estimates, by government class. Average number of observations in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients (95%) are marked  
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Some of the results from the regression are presented in Table 3. For a complete list of 
coefficient estimates, see Appendix C.  
  Unempl. Gap Government stance Unempl * Govt 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value Coef (ζ ) P-Value R-Sq. N 
Change in CAB -0.0013 0.068 0.000016 0.849 0.000053 0.136 0.2306 323 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Imp. 0.0020 0.004 -0.000019 0.818 0.000070 0.050 0.3251 354 
Holden-Braconier 0.0000 0.974 -0.000012 0.907 0.000041 0.324 0.2685 328 
Level indicators:           
CAB -0.0013 0.191 -0.000289 0.016 0.000136 0.007 0.5755 334 
Discr. budget balance 0.0033 0.165 0.000578 0.039 -0.000153 0.192 0.4079 345 
Discr. budget balance, c 0.0046 0.056 0.000180 0.534 -0.000014 0.912 0.4645 326 
Coefficients in bold are significant on a 95% level. 
 Table 3: Coefficients for political stance 
Both significant coefficients lead to the same conclusion: A more conservative 
government leads a less countercyclical fiscal policy. A switch from a government 
moderately to the left on the scale (-5) to a government moderately to the right (+5) 
would give an increase in the responsiveness of fiscal policy to unemployment gap (a 
shift away from Keynesianism) of about .001. Given the previously determined sizes of 
the coefficients, this is a visible effect, but not as large as country-specific differences. 
 
It should be noted that the inclusion of political variables does not increase the 2R -values 
much for any equation, meaning that the political data does not improve the fit of the 
model. The p-value for unemployment gaps do indeed go down for some indicators. For 
this reason, care should be taken not to over-interpret the results; similar variations in 
government stance and unemployment could be responsible for some of the high 
significance. 
 
Figure 16 suggests that the effect of political stance is not linear; that right and centre 
governments have more in common with each other than they have with “centre/right” 
governments, for example. One reason of this could be that centre/right-governments are 
more likely to be weak, relying on support from both sides of the political spectrum. For 
this reason, it is interesting to include government strength as an explanatory variable. 
The share of seats in parliament held by the government is used, as discussed in chapter 
2. 
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The modified equation is64 
( ) ( ) ittititititititititi ZSUSGUGUF εγλκζψβα ++⋅++⋅+++= −−−−−−−− 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,, . 
Estimates for ζ (Unempl * Govt) and λ  (Unempl * Strength) are presented in Table 4. 
The remaining coefficients are shown in Appendix C. 
  Unempl. gap Unempl * Govt Unempl * Strength 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value Coef P-Value R-Sq. N 
Change in CAB 0.0041 0.149 0.000058 0.100 -0.000094 0.049 0.2425 323 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Imp. 0.0086 0.003 0.000074 0.037 -0.000114 0.019 0.3377 354 
Holden-Braconier 0.0056 0.098 0.000050 0.236 -0.000095 0.087 0.2762 328 
Level indicators:           
CAB -0.0116 0.004 0.000121 0.014 0.000176 0.010 0.5908 334 
Discr. budget balance 0.0209 0.018 -0.000141 0.229 -0.000305 0.039 0.4167 345 
Discr. budget balance, c 0.0282 0.002 0.000022 0.860 -0.000407 0.006 0.4791 326 
Coefficients in bold are significant on a 95% level. 
Table 4: Coefficients for political stance and government strength 
Several significant results are found for government strength. All significant results but 
one support the hypothesis on government strength: Weaker governments have less 
countercyclical policy. The effects are of about the same magnitude as the effect of 
political stance. The CAB does, in this case, give a significant result in an opposite 
direction; I do not have a good explanation for this.  
Inserting government strength as a control variable does not improve the fit. The 2R -
values are approximately the same.  Combined with the clear disagreements between the 
indicators, this leads me not to conclude clearly on the question of government strength.  
When considering the effects of government strength, differentiating between booms 
(when it would be hard for a “weak” government not to increase spending) and recessions 
(where a “weak” government might easily lead countercyclical policy) would be an 
interesting approach. As this question is not the central aspect of this thesis, I will not 
pursue this discussion any further, I will, however, argue that the former effect seems to 
dominate; the difference between strong and weak governments could thus be assumed to 
be more pronounced in booms. 
 
                                                 
64 Dummies still included… 
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To sum up, I have found weak evidence that parties to the left are more Keynesian. I have 
also found suggestions that strong governments have more freedom to run countercyclical 
policy. As the CAB systematically disagrees with the other indicators, I cannot make any 
clear conclusions; however, I will stick to my claim that there is some support in the data 
for Hypothesis 4: that conservative parties have less regard for countercyclical policy. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The main conclusion from this thesis is that the characterisation of fiscal policy is heavily 
dependent on the choice of fiscal indicator. I have examined four different indicators 
(OECD’s Cyclically Adjusted Balance, Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse, the Holden-
Braconier indicator and the discretionary budget balance) and found that the results vary 
widely. This may have implications for the interpretations of previous studies of the 
subject. The difference is especially pronounced for the OECD indicator, which in 
several cases have significant results different from the other indicators.  
 
Even controlling for the various ways of indicating fiscal stance, some results may be 
found. 
 
I have found some evidence of procyclical fiscal policy. To return to the discussion in 
the introduction, this could mean that the main value of the baseline Keynesian model is 
pedagogic, and that too many other factors influence the decisions before they are made, 
or that politicians have little regard for such models. Apart from the incompleteness of 
governments and influence of lobby groups, this could be caused by an interpretation of 
recessions as a reduction in expected income or an adherence to rules-based policy. The 
picture will of course differ within countries, and may fluctuate over time. For some 
countries, most notably Portugal, countercyclical tendencies are found. 
Estimations using the OECD’s cyclically adjusted balance differ from this picture, and 
present an overall Keynesian tendency. When applied to the entire panel, however, this 
estimate is not significantly different from zero. 
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The influence of public debt is found to be significant; a high level of public debt 
relative to total production leads to tighter fiscal policy.  
 
When examining the differences between time periods using the OECD indicator, a 
slight movement towards Keynesian policy is found; however, other measures give a 
different picture. Historical trends in fiscal policy, if they exist, are too weak to be found 
with the methodology used in this dissertation. 
 
The influences of political points of view are also unclear, but the strongest tendency is 
that conservative governments use Keynesian policy less often. Most methods also 
suggest that governments with more support in the parliament have fewer problems 
running a countercyclical policy.  
 
Some of the more inconclusive aspects of this thesis point at several fields that will 
probably be more thoroughly researched in the future. The definitions of discretionary 
fiscal policy obviously need some work, as there are huge disruptions between 
calculations. The inclusion of more qualitative aspects in the analysis of fiscal policy 
while retaining an ability to generalise across countries would be valuable. 
Balanced budget changes are not considered in this thesis; an analysis on the different 
motivations for lowering taxes or increasing public expenditure and the possible 
dependence of political influence would be interesting to read. More explicit political 
economy-modelling might also be used to study questions like these, incorporating 
problems related to “selling” a fiscal contraction and games between monetary and fiscal 
policy makers. Through some of these issues are not discussed thoroughly in this thesis, I 
still thinks it give a fair overview of the problem of characterising governments as 
Keynesian, and some important tentative conclusions on the subject. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Details on fiscal indicator calculation 
A1. Cyclically adjusted balance 















































where Y* is potential output, α and β elasticities, and T and G taxes and expenditure, 
respectively. Taxes and tax elasticities are decomposed into subgroups. 
A2. Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse  
This presentation follows the outline in Alesina and Perotti (1996a), p. 10.66  
To obtain estimates of the effect of unemployment on transfers and taxes, an OLS 























where TR1, TR2 and TR3 are time trend variables (increase by 1 per year) for the periods 
1960-1975, 1976-1992, and 1993-2004, respectively.67 These parameters are calculated 










⎡ −∆= 44 ˆˆ~ βα  
                                                 
65 The equation is taken from van den Noord (2000), p. 18 
66 It was presented to me via a work note from Steinar Holden. The calculation is an extended version of a 
batch file created by Simen Markussen. 
67 The periodization is chosen to be consistent with Alesina/Perotti (1996a), and thereby also with Holden 
(2005). This was given higher priority than sticking to the time series division used in the rest of this thesis. 
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The effect of the change in the unemployment rate is thus estimated as the increase in 
transfers that come with increased unemployment minus the increase (that is, plus the 
decrease) in tax income. 
A3. Holden-Braconier indicator 
A3.1 Revenues 
The tax bases are assumed to be related to the following bases:  
TYH (household taxes) grows at the same rate as household income (HINC).  
TYB (business taxes) grows at the same rate as business income (BINC).  
TIND (indirect taxes) grows at the same rate as consumption (CONS).  
SSRG (social security payments received) grows at the same rate as total wage income. 
TOCR (other receipts) grows at the same rate as (nominal) GDP. 





















































and combined with the observed revenues as explained in the text. 
A3.2 Expenditures 















































These are then combined to estimate the combined effect as explained in the text. 
A4. The discretionary budget balance  
Trend levels for the variables are assumed to grow log-linearly. Regressing log(GDP) on 
year yields an RSS of .02, whereas a linear regression yields .24. As the GDP curve is 
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ever increasing in time, a linear prediction (with a five-year moving average, as I use 
here) would be downward biased. Using log-linear trending should help avoiding this. 
Below, tildes (~) indicate log values, so )log(~ tt GG = . 
A4.1 Expenditures 














t GG  
Trend growth (per year) is calculated as  
4
~~~ 51 −− −
=∆ tttrend GGG  













The indicator is based only on observances assumed to be available at time t. 
A4.2 Revenues – simple   














t ττ  
Trend growth (per year) is calculated as  
4
~~~ 51 −− −
=∆ tttrend τττ  
The induced level of τ  for year t is thus 
trendtrend
t





and the induced tax level (for the discretionary parts) 
GDPT trendtrend ⋅= τ  
A4.3 Revenues – complex  
The tax system is defined as 
{ }othersocialindirectnessbusihousehold τττττ ,,,,=Θ  
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where τ  are the postulated tax rates. 

























TYH ,,,, , which means that tΘ
~
 is the vector 
containing logs of the estimated tax rates. 









































=Θ   
for all tax rates (TYB, TIND etc.) 
This is used with the data for year t to calculate induced expenditure. 
{ }ttttttrendttrend YWAGESCONSBINCHINCT ,,,,⋅Θ=  
This scalar product gives the trend value of public expenditure. Note that the observedCT  
used in the final calculation includes SSRG, while the observedT  used in the “simple” 
calculation does not. 
A5. Fiscal indicator correlations 
The correlations between the indicators (for the 405 observations where all are available) 
are as follows:  
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Change indicators: dbalr dcabr bfi dbd  balr cabr bd bdc 
Ch. in prim. bal 1.0000         
Change in CAB 0.7832 1.0000        
Blanchard’s FI 0.9606 0.7589 1.0000       
Holden-Braconier 0.7876 0.7514 0.7752 1.0000      
Level indicators:          
Primary balance 0.2905 0.1766 0.2639 0.1220  1.0000    
CAB 0.2434 0.2627 0.2289 0.1636  0.7097 1.0000   
Disc. budg. bal 0.4894 0.4593 0.4683 0.5995  -0.1169 0.0223 1.0000  
DBB, complex 0.5462 0.4984 0.5092 0.6853  -0.1227 0.0245 0.9060 1.0000 
The change indicators have high correlation coefficients. Correlation is lower among the 
level indicator, implying greater difference in calculation methods there. Correlation 
between the level and change indicators is quite high.  
A6. Cyclical indicator correlations 
The correlations between cyclical variables and fiscal indicators are as follows  
Cyclical indicators: Ugap u gdpgap 
Unemployment gap 1.0000   
Unemployment 0.6725 1.0000  
Output gap -0.7844 -0.4364 1.0000 
Change indicators:    
Ch. in prim. bal 0.0774 0.1084 0.1008 
Change in CAB 0.0884 0.0924 -0.0510 
Blanchard’s FI 0.1082 0.1204 0.0516 
Holden-Braconier 0.2049 0.1040 -0.1235 
Level indicators:    
Primary balance -0.3543 -0.1218 0.4390 
CAB 0.0167 0.1747 0.0192 
Disc. budg. bal 0.3833 0.1781 -0.3276 
DBB, complex 0.3968 0.1795 -0.3197 
(number of obs=405) 
As noted in the main text, the unemployment gap is placed “between” the unemployment 
rate and the output gap; it has the highest correlation with both.  
Appendix B: Data sources  
Economic data: 
The backbone of the data file is the OECD Economic Outlook data for 2004. This is 
accessible from http://new.sourceoecd.org for subscribers. All economic data is obtained 
from this source, except the following data taken from Holden (2005) 
• Unemployment benefits  
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• Household income (originally from OECD EO) 
• Business income, constructed as (GDP – {Total wage bill} – {Employer 
contribution to social security and pensions} – {self-employment income 
(missing)} – TIND + TSUB) 
• Wage bill 
 
Fiscal indicators: 
• balr / dbalr: From OECD EO – scaled by GDP as explained in the text. 
• cabr / dcabr: From OECD EO – scaled by GDP as explained in the text. 
• bfi: Constructed. STATA do-file available on request. The calculation is based 
on a similar version (running only to 1992) made by Simen Markussen. 
• dbd: Compiled by Simen Markussen for Steinar Holden using OECD EO data 
and some supplementary data (received from Braconier via OECD? – ask!) 
• bd: Constructed as explained in the text.  
• bdc: Constructed as explained in the text. HINC, BINC and WAGES have the 
same sources as for the Holden-Braconier indicator. 
Political indicators: 
• McDonald and Mendes: Downloaded from http://www.binghamton.edu/polsci/ 
research/mcdonalddata.htm (the file name is http://www.binghamton.edu/ 
polsci/research/Governments.sav). Codebook is available from the same address. 
• Swank (used for verification): Downloaded from http://www.marquette.edu/ 
polisci/Swank.htm. Codebook is available from the same address. 
• Ardagna (used for verification): Received by mail via Steinar Holden and Simen 
Markussen 
 
Appendix C: Regression results  
This appendix presents regression results that are not shown as tables in the text. 
Intercepts and dummy coefficients are not shown.  
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C1. By country estimates 
Only results significant on a 95% level are shown. 
Change in primary balance 
  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia     0.3291 16 
Austria     0.0368 34 
Belgium     0.1498 33 
Canada     0.2027 34 
Denmark 0.0072   0.3996 24 
Finland     0.1711 29 
France 0.0052   0.2631 27 
Germany     0.0762 38 
Greece     0.0136 29 
Ireland     0.2713 25 
Italy     0.0499 39 
Japan 0.0077   0.1430 34 
Netherlands     0.1954 24 
New Zealand 0.0120   0.5963 12 
Norway     0.0151 26 
Portugal     0.2906 9 
Spain     0.2239 14 
Sweden 0.0081   0.3248 34 
UK 0.0039   0.1630 34 
US     0.1091 39 
 
Change in CAB 
  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia     0.2722 16 
Austria     0.0491 31 
Belgium     0.0613 32 
Canada     0.1193 34 
Denmark     0.1009 24 
Finland     0.0579 27 
France     0.0979 27 
Germany     0.0074 35 
Greece     0.0134 28 
Ireland     0.1313 24 
Italy     0.0261 39 
Japan     0.1096 33 
Netherlands     0.0303 24 
New Zealand     0.2552 12 
Norway     0.0409 25 
Portugal -0.0177 0.4589 0.7575 9 
Spain     0.0239 14 
Sweden     0.2428 24 
UK     0.0167 33 
US     0.0594 38 
Blanchard's Fiscal Impulse 
  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia     0.2881 16 
Austria     0.0361 34 
Belgium     0.1716 33 
Canada     0.1848 34 
Denmark     0.1752 24 
Finland     0.1704 29 
France 0.0060   0.3221 27 
Germany     0.0806 38 
Greece     0.0338 29 
Ireland     0.2899 25 
Italy     0.0491 39 
Japan 0.0076   0.1470 34 
Netherlands   0.0324 0.1951 32 
New Zealand     0.4229 12 
Norway     0.0121 26 
Portugal -0.0295 0.8346 0.9273 9 
Spain     0.3460 14 
Sweden 0.0074   0.3448 34 
UK 0.0038   0.1750 34 
US     0.0176 39 
 
Holden-Braconier indicator 
  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia     0.2851 15 
Austria     0.0144 33 
Belgium 0.0035   0.1863 31 
Canada     0.1099 29 
Denmark     0.1065 13 
Finland     0.0682 28 
France     0.1507 25 
Germany 0.0056   0.1744 37 
Greece       0 
Ireland       0 
Italy     0.0579 37 
Japan     0.1046 32 
Netherlands     0.0216 30 
New Zealand     0.3126 11 
Norway     0.0374 25 
Portugal       0 
Spain     0.0692 13 
Sweden     0.1292 33 
UK     0.0187 28 
US     0.0647 33 





  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia -0.0137   0.5295 16 
Austria -0.0224 0.0291 0.2847 34 
Belgium -0.0078 0.1163 0.6204 33 
Canada -0.0132 0.1631 0.6766 35 
Denmark -0.0195 0.1638 0.4914 24 
Finland -0.0091   0.2981 29 
France     0.0259 27 
Germany     0.0954 38 
Greece   0.0722 0.5245 29 
Ireland     0.0198 25 
Italy -0.0116 0.1107 0.7294 39 
Japan -0.0223   0.4005 34 
Netherlands   0.0702 0.2119 25 
New Zealand     0.3069 12 
Norway -0.0416   0.3885 27 
Portugal     0.3485 9 
Spain -0.0077 0.2558 0.7459 14 
Sweden     0.1033 34 
UK     0.0903 35 
US -0.0059 0.0594 0.2861 39 
 
Cyclically adjusted balance 
  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia -0.0103   0.5243 16 
Austria -0.0158 0.0369 0.2977 32 
Belgium   0.1237 0.6971 33 
Canada -0.0098 0.1634 0.7122 35 
Denmark -0.0127 0.1128 0.4931 24 
Finland     0.1063 28 
France     0.1971 27 
Germany     0.2271 36 
Greece   0.0810 0.5594 29 
Ireland     0.0941 25 
Italy -0.0101 0.1124 0.7682 39 
Japan -0.0189   0.3722 34 
Netherlands 0.0047   0.2484 25 
New Zealand   0.1021 0.6225 12 
Norway -0.0172   0.2436 26 
Portugal -0.0125 0.5522 0.8718 9 
Spain -0.0045 0.2097 0.6529 14 
Sweden -0.0202 0.2409 0.4144 25 
UK     0.0239 34 
US -0.0041 0.0550 0.2196 39 
Discretionary budget balance 
  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia 0.0237   0.6717 16 
Austria     0.1268 34 
Belgium     0.1129 30 
Canada 0.0170   0.2107 39 
Denmark     0.3228 24 
Finland     0.1509 29 
France 0.0256   0.3277 27 
Germany 0.0305   0.3745 38 
Greece       0 
Ireland 0.0289   0.2122 23 
Italy     0.0899 39 
Japan 0.0750 -0.0819 0.4228 30 
Netherlands 0.0158   0.2115 31 
New Zealand     0.3530 12 
Norway     0.0987 22 
Portugal -0.0375 1.7875 0.8004 9 
Spain     0.3529 14 
Sweden 0.0238   0.4227 34 
UK 0.0136   0.2923 30 
US     0.1222 39 
 
Discretionary budget balance, complex 
  ugap1 debtratio1 R-Squared N 
Australia       0 
Austria     0.1266 30 
Belgium 0.0179   0.2493 30 
Canada 0.0195   0.2984 39 
Denmark     0.2980 12 
Finland 0.0110 -0.1202 0.2248 29 
France 0.0267   0.3903 27 
Germany 0.0276   0.3150 38 
Greece       0 
Ireland 0.0273   0.2019 23 
Italy     0.1066 39 
Japan 0.0660 -0.0789 0.4773 30 
Netherlands     0.1136 30 
New Zealand 0.0797 -0.5158 0.5796 12 
Norway     0.0592 22 
Portugal -0.0586 2.5032 0.9941 5 
Spain     0.1872 14 
Sweden 0.0292   0.4657 34 
UK 0.0167   0.2628 37 
US     0.1417 39 
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C2. Time trends estimates 
1960-1972 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in primary balance 0.0047 0.302 -0.1071 0.368 0.5822 31 
Change in CAB 0.0045 0.484 -0.0130 0.943 0.7034 20 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0047 0.305 -0.1812 0.140 0.6000 31 
Holden-Braconier 0.0006 0.899 -0.1598 0.226 0.6601 31 
Level indicators:     
Primary balance 0.0014 0.765 -0.1040 0.336 0.8672 33 
CAB 0.0002 0.950 -0.3219 0.006 0.9178 26 
Discretionary budget balance -0.0021 0.915 -1.3018 0.013 0.5723 31 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0232 0.207 -0.0737 0.800 0.5954 34 
 
1973-1982 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in primary balance 0.0008 0.668 0.0426 0.068 0.3656 120 
Change in CAB -0.0021 0.338 0.0046 0.854 0.2829 106 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0005 0.792 0.0318 0.152 0.3453 128 
Holden-Braconier -0.0030 0.144 0.0251 0.288 0.2641 116 
Level indicators:     
Primary balance -0.0025 0.220 -0.0521 0.034 0.7516 122 
CAB -0.0021 0.292 -0.0658 0.005 0.7763 113 
Discretionary budget balance 0.0003 0.959 0.0426 0.590 0.5319 108 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0000 0.998 -0.0618 0.396 0.5657 105 
 
1983-1992 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in primary balance -0.0001 0.921 0.1001 0.000 0.3983 166 
Change in CAB -0.0031 0.010 0.0718 0.000 0.2994 166 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0008 0.548 0.0951 0.000 0.3762 166 
Holden-Braconier -0.0011 0.472 0.0481 0.042 0.2944 140 
Level indicators:     
Primary balance -0.0092 0.000 0.1169 0.000 0.5999 166 
CAB -0.0032 0.029 0.0795 0.000 0.6705 166 
Discretionary budget balance 0.0034 0.410 0.0800 0.208 0.3781 156 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0028 0.490 0.0261 0.670 0.4547 142 
 
1993-2004 Unempl. gap Debt/GDP ratio 
Change indicators: Coef P-Value Coef P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
Change in primary balance 0.0009 0.338 0.0261 0.005 0.3872 237 
Change in CAB -0.0007 0.375 0.0219 0.005 0.2278 237 
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0017 0.094 0.0225 0.016 0.3526 237 
Holden-Braconier 0.0001 0.936 0.0178 0.297 0.1905 166 
Level indicators:     
Primary balance -0.0084 0.000 0.0254 0.035 0.7164 237 
CAB -0.0036 0.001 0.0201 0.040 0.7912 237 
Discretionary budget balance 0.0057 0.080 -0.0072 0.810 0.3563 225 
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0074 0.026 -0.0069 0.817 0.4000 209 
Coefficients in bold are significant on a 95% level. 
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C3. Political indicators estimates 
Estimation by political position: 
  
 
Left (govlr3 < -12) ugap1 P-Value debtratio1 P-Value R-Squared N 
dbalr -0.0021 0.414 0.0345 0.305 0.4551 87 
dcabr -0.0043 0.074 0.0261 0.566 0.5329 72 
bfi -0.0006 0.804 0.0260 0.388 0.4886 92 
dbd -0.0046 0.050 0.0266 0.381 0.5147 90 
balr -0.0079 0.002 0.0020 0.949 0.7669 89 
cabr -0.0037 0.066 -0.0289 0.357 0.9146 77 
bd 0.0013 0.871 0.1891 0.233 0.5182 86 
bdc -0.0062 0.424 0.0095 0.941 0.5790 84 
Centre - Left (-12 <= govlr3 < -5)      
dbalr -0.0002 0.927 0.0435 0.122 0.6179 79 
dcabr -0.0039 0.084 0.0411 0.102 0.5691 76 
bfi 0.0000 0.998 0.0377 0.180 0.5912 80 
dbd -0.0005 0.833 0.0699 0.029 0.7577 68 
balr -0.0145 0.000 0.0586 0.013 0.9133 80 
cabr -0.0090 0.001 0.0653 0.016 0.8454 78 
bd 0.0056 0.391 0.0286 0.660 0.7027 83 
bdc 0.0037 0.541 0.0137 0.812 0.7519 77 
Centre (-5 <= govlr3 < 5)      
dbalr 0.0040 0.074 0.0502 0.223 0.7771 83 
dcabr -0.0007 0.771 0.0332 0.456 0.6892 79 
bfi 0.0037 0.132 0.0724 0.107 0.6863 85 
dbd 0.0014 0.588 0.0243 0.610 0.7213 80 
balr 0.0017 0.573 0.0087 0.875 0.8672 84 
cabr 0.0023 0.497 0.0302 0.634 0.8158 82 
bd -0.0027 0.704 0.1676 0.195 0.7391 84 
bdc 0.0007 0.930 0.1671 0.266 0.7734 79 
Centre - Right (5 <= govlr3 < 12)      
dbalr 0.0044 0.359 0.0664 0.297 0.9045 38 
dcabr 0.0026 0.662 0.0440 0.573 0.8693 38 
bfi 0.0078 0.151 0.0675 0.328 0.8828 38 
dbd 0.0154 0.104 0.1397 0.242 0.8175 38 
balr 0.0087 0.013 0.3177 0.000 0.9759 38 
cabr 0.0110 0.020 0.3484 0.000 0.9595 38 
bd 0.0435 0.032 0.4409 0.082 0.9250 35 
bdc 0.0462 0.017 0.4884 0.039 0.9668 36 
Right (govlr3 >= 12)      
dbalr 0.0068 0.041 0.0158 0.664 0.6881 59 
dcabr 0.0026 0.327 -0.0052 0.857 0.5851 58 
bfi 0.0060 0.026 0.0159 0.586 0.6910 59 
dbd 0.0002 0.945 0.0149 0.649 0.6953 52 
balr -0.0038 0.244 0.1671 0.000 0.9336 59 
cabr -0.0005 0.847 0.1500 0.000 0.9318 59 
bd -0.0009 0.924 0.0547 0.609 0.5405 57 
bdc 0.0013 0.914 -0.0176 0.892 0.5921 50 
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Government stance and interactions: 
  Unempl. Gap Government stance Unempl * Govt Debt/GDP ratio 
(abbreviated:) ugap1 P-Value lgovlr3 P-Value uginteract P-Value debtratio1 P-Value R-Squared N 
dbalr 0.0015 0.047 -0.000038 0.667 0.000082 0.027 0.0261 0.000 0.3496 346 
dcabr -0.0013 0.068 0.000016 0.849 0.000053 0.136 0.0235 0.001 0.2306 323 
bfi 0.0020 0.004 -0.000019 0.818 0.000070 0.050 0.0255 0.000 0.3251 354 
dbd 0.0000 0.974 -0.000012 0.907 0.000041 0.324 0.0239 0.002 0.2685 328 
             
balr -0.0062 0.000 -0.000365 0.009 0.000155 0.009 0.0630 0.000 0.4694 350 
cabr -0.0013 0.191 -0.000289 0.016 0.000136 0.007 0.0719 0.000 0.5755 334 
bd 0.0033 0.165 0.000578 0.039 -0.000153 0.192 0.0599 0.014 0.4079 345 
bdc 0.0046 0.056 0.000180 0.534 -0.000014 0.912 0.0144 0.493 0.4645 326 
 
Government stance, strength and interactions: 
  Unempl. Gap Government stance Government strength  
Change indicators: ugap1 P-Value lgovlr3 P-Value lgovspct P-Value  
Change in primary balance 0.0070 0.020 -0.000039 0.655 0.000065 0.535  
Change in CAB 0.0041 0.149 0.000018 0.832 0.000008 0.936  
Blanchard’s Fiscal Impulse 0.0086 0.003 -0.000017 0.842 0.000041 0.684  
Holden-Braconier 0.0056 0.098 -0.000016 0.871 0.000050 0.657  
Level indicators:        
Primary balance -0.0157 0.001 -0.000373 0.008 -0.000016 0.923  
CAB -0.0116 0.004 -0.000246 0.039 -0.000374 0.010  
Discretionary budget balance 0.0209 0.018 0.000589 0.036 0.000066 0.829  
Discretionary budget balance, c 0.0282 0.002 0.000178 0.536 0.000141 0.645  
 
 Unempl * Govt Unempl * Strength Debt/GDP ratio 
(cont'd) uginteract P-Value usinteract P-Value debtratio1 P-Value 
R-
Squared N 
dbalr 0.000086 0.020 -0.000096 0.056 0.0238 0.001 0.3577 346 
dcabr 0.000058 0.100 -0.000094 0.049 0.0213 0.003 0.2425 323 
bfi 0.000074 0.037 -0.000114 0.019 0.0228 0.001 0.3377 354 
dbd 0.000050 0.236 -0.000095 0.087 0.0219 0.005 0.2762 328 
           
balr 0.000147 0.012 0.000166 0.038 0.0661 0.000 0.4775 350 
cabr 0.000121 0.014 0.000176 0.010 0.0770 0.000 0.5908 334 
bd -0.000141 0.229 -0.000305 0.039 0.0502 0.042 0.4167 345 
bdc 0.000022 0.860 -0.000407 0.006 0.0103 0.620 0.4791 326 
 
68 Jørgen Heibø Modalsli 
Appendix D: Available on request 
Some information was not suitable for an appendix on paper. The following can be 
obtained from the author on request (my e-mail address is currently 
j.h.modalsli@student.sv.uio.no):  
• Regression output logs from STATA for all equations 
• Excel data presentation macros (not very user-friendly) 
• McDonald / Mendes data conversion macro (not very user-friendly either) 
• Stata do-file with calculations 
• Data file (I do not think that I am allowed to distribute OECD Economic Outlook 
data freely; until anything else is proved, the file will only be made available to 
those examining (censoring?) the thesis.) 
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